

Syllabus & Reading List

This course examines the formal literature on conflict that has developed in the last two decades. It is meant to expose students to the techniques and models used in this line of research. The course will help graduate students identify the broad direction of international conflict studies and will also permit graduate students to pursue topics or ideas of their own interest. To that end, we set aside two classes for "model building sessions" where students can explore approaches to formalize some of the ideas in the substantive literature, or explore extensions of the current formal literature. The course covers both complete and incomplete information models and thus students must have completed Psc584 (or its equivalent) prior to taking this course.

There are three main obligations for students taking the course. Reading the required articles and participating in class is the first and most important of the obligations. The second obligation is taking a turn presenting one of the topics from the reading list. Assignments of topics will be worked out at the first class meeting. The last requirement for the course is a final paper. The two model building sessions during the semester will be focused on helping students develop their ideas for final papers.

Schedule: Starting on the next page is the list of topics and the scheduled readings for the course. Naturally, this schedule may change as the semester unfolds.

Week 1 Introductory Thoughts and Review of Bargaining

Week 2 Rationalist Explanations for War

Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49:379-414.

Fearon, James D. 1996. "Bargaining over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power"

Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization* 60:169-203.

Week 3 Bargaining and Fighting

Powell, Robert. 2004. "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.2:344-361.

Slantchev, Branislav. 2003. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations." *American Political Science Review* 47:621-632.

Wolford, Scott, Dan Reiter and Clifford J. Carrubba. 2011. "Information, Commitment, and War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55:556-579.

Week 4 Signaling and Audience Costs

Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88:577-592

Kurizaki, Shuhei. 2007. "Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy." *American Political Science Review* 101.3:543-558.

Tarar, Ahmer and Bahar Leventoglu. 2013. "Limited Audience Costs in International Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57.6:1065-1089.

Week 5 General Results on Crisis Bargaining

Banks, Jeffrey S. 1990. "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining

Fey, Mark and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2012. "Uncertainty and Incentives and Crisis Bargaining." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.1:149-169.

Fey, Mark, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2013. "Credibility of Peaceful Agreements in Crisis Bargaining." *Political Science Research and Methods*

Fey, Mark and Brenton Kenkel. 2014. "Choosing to Make an Ultimatum"

Week 6 Mutual Optimism

Fey, Mark, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2007. "Mutual Optimism and War." *American Journal of Political Science* 51:738-754.

Branislav L. Slantchev and Ahmer Tarar. 2011. "Mutual optimism as a rationalist explanation of war." *American Journal of Political Science*

Robert W. Rauchhaus. 2006. "Asymmetric information, mediation and conflict management." *World Politics*, 58:207-241

Fey, Mark, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2010. "When is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation." *World Politics* 62:529-560.

Week 10 Alliances and Coalitions

Smith, Alastair. 1995. "Alliance Formation and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 39.4:405-426.

Benson, Brett V., Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. "Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*

Wolford, Scott. 2014. "Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining." *American Journal of Political Science* 58:144-156

Week 11 Reputation

Sartori, Anne E. 2002. "The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes." *International Organization* 56:121-149.

Daniel Treisman. 2004. "Rational Appeasement." *International Organization* 58:345-373

Sechser, Todd S. 2010. "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power." *International Organization* 64(4):627-60.

Week 12 Model Building Session

Week 13 Contest Models

Hirshleifer, Jack. 1991. "The Paradox of Power." *Economics and Politics* 3:177-200.

Michelle R. Garinkel and Stergios Skaperdas. 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44:793-807

Roland Hodler and Hadi Yektas. 2012. "All-pay War." *Games and Economic Behavior* 74:526-540

Week 14 Models of Peace